Deleuze 1990: Difference between revisions
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== Second Series of Paradoxes of Surface Effects == | == Second Series of Paradoxes of Surface Effects == | ||
moves to a new dualism: | |||
Stoic distinction between bodies and events | |||
* Stoics are trying to reconfigure the field in which things can be thought | |||
broken down into three parts, four paragraphs each | |||
1-4: moves from Platonic dualism to Stoic dualism; | |||
5-8: drawing out implications of Stoic dualism for philosophy | |||
(9-12: echo of that in Lewis Carroll) | |||
=== Paragraphs 1-4=== | |||
straight reading of Stoicism | |||
PARAGRAPH 1: | |||
STOICS: | |||
distinction bw bodies (para 1) and events (para 2) | |||
implications for understanding of matter, causality, time | |||
1) materialism: | |||
Stoics claim that all that exist are bodies; | |||
bodies that we see are mixtures of elements; | |||
Deleuze says we can refer to a particular arrangement of bodies (state of affairs) | |||
overall State of Affairs is arrangement of bodies as a whole | |||
2) causality: | |||
when we say body A has causal relationship with body B; | |||
can only talk about causes, not effects; | |||
3) time: | |||
from the point of view of bodies, there is only one present; | |||
from a divine perspective, there is only one present; | |||
time as unwinding of a rope (Cicero) -- Cicero's notion of fate == Deleuze's use of the term Destiny | |||
-- events have different relationship to time | |||
------ | |||
Stoic map of reality; | |||
distinction between existence [BODIES] and subsistence [EVENTS]; | |||
ex. Mickey Mouse / centaurs / etc. have different form of Being than real person; | |||
Mickey Mouse has no body; | |||
someone with a body can dress up as Mickey Mouse, but it isn't Mickey Mouse | |||
PARAGRAPH 2: | |||
effects, events don't exist but SUBSIST or INHERE; they're verbs, INFINITIVES | |||
not just INDICATED by verbs, but ARE verbs -- | |||
pure verbs, which we don't speak in, | |||
vs. conjugated verbs | |||
series of presents; | |||
only the present exists in time | |||
only the past and future SUBSIST, dividing time simultaneously | |||
PARAGRAPH 3: | |||
event is being cut; | |||
there are bodies involved (person, knife) -- but cutting is event | |||
this is INCORPOREAL | |||
effects don't happen bw bodies -- you can say a body is cut, but the being cut is not a body | |||
void is not a body, and a sayable is not a body; | |||
Deleuze is primary interested in incorporals that are "sayables" | |||
PARAGRAPH 4: | |||
more summary of points he's made above | |||
=== Paragraphs 5-8 === | |||
what difference does this make for how philosophy operates? | |||
PARAGRAPH 5: | |||
if causes are only happening in the realm of bodies, you can't have effects in that register; | |||
causes only concern events, and events are not bodies; | |||
freedom -- | |||
Stoics preserve freedom in both registers (events and bodies), | |||
in the realm of bodies: thru co-fatedness, con-causality; | |||
in the realm of events: by not assigning causes | |||
in Homeric epics, there is certain fated events, but many paths to that one fate; | |||
Stoics say no, there must be a chain of causes; | |||
this leads to understanding that all things are fatalistically determined | |||
see Cicero, "On fate" -- | |||
Chryssipus argues that this kind of fatalism can be remedied by splitting events into simple vs. complex; | |||
complex events are "co-fated": | |||
two things must be fated together for it to happen -- | |||
nexus of causalities allows you to act like there's freedom, even though everythign is fated; | |||
con-fatality | |||
[this is different from the Atomists, w/clinamen or "swerve"] | |||
PARAGRAPH 6: | |||
Stoics have category "something", biggest genus , with "bodies" as subspecies | |||
reversing Platonism (see appendix) | |||
PARAGRAPH 7: | |||
important dualism in Plato is not form and image, but form and copy; | |||
for the Stoics, this no longer matters -- Stoics "discovered surface effects" (7), | |||
recovering common sense from Platonism; | |||
the things that Plato wanted to attribute to Ideas all migrate into events in Stoic philosophy; | |||
stripping apart Plato and porting them to a different register | |||
PARAGRAPH 8: | |||
"becoming unlimited" | |||
PARAGRAPH 9: | |||
paradoxes of Stoics, entirely new way of thinking about paradoxes | |||
"Paradox appears as a dismissal of depth, a display of events at the surface, and a deployment of language along this limit." (9) | |||
many critics say these paradoxes are NONSENSE by changing the REFERENT; | |||
Deleuze interested in peculiarity of language in paradox | |||
there are dialectics of events, but not of bodies -- bodies just proliferate in materiality; | |||
there's no pressure on the world to solve this paradox (the way there is in Hegel); | |||
maintains separation between bodies and effects | |||
-- affirmation of the nonrepresentational | |||
== Third Series of the Proposition == | == Third Series of the Proposition == |
Revision as of 20:19, 30 May 2010
Deleuze, Gilles. Logic of Sense. Trans. by Mark Lester with Charles Stivale. Ed. by Constantin V. Boundas. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1990.
First Series of Paradoxes of Pure Becoming
five paragraphs:
1) introduces peculiarity to paradoxes
- any phrase of becoming is pointing in two directions at once:
to say that Alice becomes larger is to say that she is becoming smaller than she will be
- it IS just a verbal game, but a verbal game we can't think around
- we don't have any capability of thinking of the world OUTSIDE this game
- "SENSE" --> wants to connect to a directionality; we talk about things as having "sense" when they point in one direction for comparison or change
-- "Good sense affirms that in all things there is a determinable sense or direction (sens); but paradox is the affirmation of both sense or directions at the same time."
2) connects this to Plato, who helps us see these events of becoming
- Plato and Socrates as founding a defense of the life of the mind, "philosophy" as a discipline
- quotes from Philebus and Parmenides, aporetic dialogues (dialogues in which paradoxes presented are not resolved) --> Plato acknowledges problems but doesn't deal with them
3) suggests Plato was aware that strange events of becoming have connection to language
- paradoxes resist theory of Forms; is there a Form for hotter, colder? verbs? -- hotter is something that an individual JUDGES; how does that match the theory of Forms?
- see Sophist 235-6
- see pg 256 in Deleuze
- perhaps act as two languages; or two dimensions in language in general, only one of which Plato focused on
- true proportions of the object, but don't correspond to what we see
- Plato distinguishing betwee true objects and claimants, false reproductions (philosopher vs. sophist)
4) Lewis Carroll helps us see these paradoxes
- paradox of pure becoming goes in two directions at once;
- Deleuze wants to call this paradox of infinite identity: identity as sameness, but infinite in that it continues/persists in sameness
- Sorites paradox: when does a pile of pebbles become a heap? --> a heap is a LINGUISTIC thing, at which language assigns limits;
- but language also transcends limits "and restores them to the infinite equivalence of an unlimited becoming" (3)
- "infinite equivalence" -- "hotter" & "colder" are equivalent in some sense, but at the same time cannot be
5) undercuts common sense
- "infinite identity" vs. "personal identity"
- infinitives vs. substantives
Second Series of Paradoxes of Surface Effects
moves to a new dualism:
Stoic distinction between bodies and events
- Stoics are trying to reconfigure the field in which things can be thought
broken down into three parts, four paragraphs each
1-4: moves from Platonic dualism to Stoic dualism; 5-8: drawing out implications of Stoic dualism for philosophy (9-12: echo of that in Lewis Carroll)
Paragraphs 1-4
straight reading of Stoicism
PARAGRAPH 1:
STOICS: distinction bw bodies (para 1) and events (para 2) implications for understanding of matter, causality, time
1) materialism: Stoics claim that all that exist are bodies; bodies that we see are mixtures of elements; Deleuze says we can refer to a particular arrangement of bodies (state of affairs) overall State of Affairs is arrangement of bodies as a whole
2) causality: when we say body A has causal relationship with body B; can only talk about causes, not effects;
3) time: from the point of view of bodies, there is only one present; from a divine perspective, there is only one present; time as unwinding of a rope (Cicero) -- Cicero's notion of fate == Deleuze's use of the term Destiny -- events have different relationship to time
Stoic map of reality;
distinction between existence [BODIES] and subsistence [EVENTS]; ex. Mickey Mouse / centaurs / etc. have different form of Being than real person; Mickey Mouse has no body; someone with a body can dress up as Mickey Mouse, but it isn't Mickey Mouse
PARAGRAPH 2:
effects, events don't exist but SUBSIST or INHERE; they're verbs, INFINITIVES
not just INDICATED by verbs, but ARE verbs -- pure verbs, which we don't speak in, vs. conjugated verbs
series of presents; only the present exists in time only the past and future SUBSIST, dividing time simultaneously
PARAGRAPH 3:
event is being cut; there are bodies involved (person, knife) -- but cutting is event this is INCORPOREAL
effects don't happen bw bodies -- you can say a body is cut, but the being cut is not a body
void is not a body, and a sayable is not a body; Deleuze is primary interested in incorporals that are "sayables"
PARAGRAPH 4:
more summary of points he's made above
Paragraphs 5-8
what difference does this make for how philosophy operates?
PARAGRAPH 5:
if causes are only happening in the realm of bodies, you can't have effects in that register; causes only concern events, and events are not bodies;
freedom -- Stoics preserve freedom in both registers (events and bodies), in the realm of bodies: thru co-fatedness, con-causality; in the realm of events: by not assigning causes
in Homeric epics, there is certain fated events, but many paths to that one fate; Stoics say no, there must be a chain of causes; this leads to understanding that all things are fatalistically determined
see Cicero, "On fate" -- Chryssipus argues that this kind of fatalism can be remedied by splitting events into simple vs. complex; complex events are "co-fated": two things must be fated together for it to happen -- nexus of causalities allows you to act like there's freedom, even though everythign is fated; con-fatality
[this is different from the Atomists, w/clinamen or "swerve"]
PARAGRAPH 6:
Stoics have category "something", biggest genus , with "bodies" as subspecies
reversing Platonism (see appendix)
PARAGRAPH 7:
important dualism in Plato is not form and image, but form and copy;
for the Stoics, this no longer matters -- Stoics "discovered surface effects" (7), recovering common sense from Platonism;
the things that Plato wanted to attribute to Ideas all migrate into events in Stoic philosophy; stripping apart Plato and porting them to a different register
PARAGRAPH 8:
"becoming unlimited"
PARAGRAPH 9:
paradoxes of Stoics, entirely new way of thinking about paradoxes
"Paradox appears as a dismissal of depth, a display of events at the surface, and a deployment of language along this limit." (9)
many critics say these paradoxes are NONSENSE by changing the REFERENT; Deleuze interested in peculiarity of language in paradox
there are dialectics of events, but not of bodies -- bodies just proliferate in materiality; there's no pressure on the world to solve this paradox (the way there is in Hegel); maintains separation between bodies and effects -- affirmation of the nonrepresentational