Deleuze 1990: Difference between revisions
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== First Series of Paradoxes of Pure Becoming == | == First Series of Paradoxes of Pure Becoming == | ||
five paragraphs: | |||
1) ''introduces peculiarity to paradoxes'' | |||
* any phrase of becoming is pointing in two directions at once: | |||
to say that Alice becomes larger is to say that she is becoming smaller than she will be | |||
* it IS just a verbal game, but a verbal game we can't think around | |||
* we don't have any capability of thinking of the world OUTSIDE this game | |||
"SENSE" --> wants to connect to a directionality; we talk about things as having "sense" when they point in one direction for comparison or change | |||
-- "Good sense affirms that in all things there is a determinable sense or direction (sens); but paradox is the affirmation of both sense or directions at the same time." | |||
2) ''connects this to Plato, who helps us see these events of becoming'' | |||
* Plato and Socrates as founding a defense of the life of the mind, "philosophy" as a discipline | |||
* quotes from Philebus and Parmenides, aporetic dialogues (dialogues in which paradoxes presented are not resolved) --> Plato acknowledges problems but doesn't deal with them | |||
3) ''suggests Plato was aware that strange events of becoming have connection to language'' | |||
* paradoxes resist theory of Forms; is there a Form for hotter, colder? verbs? -- hotter is something that an individual JUDGES; how does that match the theory of Forms? | |||
* see Sophist 235-6 | |||
* see pg 256 in Deleuze | |||
* perhaps act as two languages; or two dimensions in language in general, only one of which Plato focused on | |||
* true proportions of the object, but don't correspond to what we see | |||
* Plato distinguishing betwee true objects and claimants, false reproductions (philosopher vs. sophist) | |||
4) ''Lewis Carroll helps us see these paradoxes'' | |||
* paradox of pure becoming goes in two directions at once; | |||
* Deleuze wants to call this paradox of infinite identity: identity as sameness, but infinite in that it continues/persists in sameness | |||
* Sorites paradox: when does a pile of pebbles become a heap? --> a heap is a LINGUISTIC thing, at which language assigns limits; | |||
* but language also transcends limits "and restores them to the infinite equivalence of an unlimited becoming" (3) | |||
* "infinite equivalence" -- "hotter" & "colder" are equivalent in some sense, but at the same time cannot be | |||
5) ''undercuts common sense'' | |||
* "infinite identity" vs. "personal identity" | |||
* infinitives vs. substantives | |||
== Second Series of Paradoxes of Surface Effects == | == Second Series of Paradoxes of Surface Effects == |
Revision as of 20:17, 30 May 2010
Deleuze, Gilles. Logic of Sense. Trans. by Mark Lester with Charles Stivale. Ed. by Constantin V. Boundas. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1990.
First Series of Paradoxes of Pure Becoming
five paragraphs:
1) introduces peculiarity to paradoxes
- any phrase of becoming is pointing in two directions at once:
to say that Alice becomes larger is to say that she is becoming smaller than she will be
- it IS just a verbal game, but a verbal game we can't think around
- we don't have any capability of thinking of the world OUTSIDE this game
"SENSE" --> wants to connect to a directionality; we talk about things as having "sense" when they point in one direction for comparison or change -- "Good sense affirms that in all things there is a determinable sense or direction (sens); but paradox is the affirmation of both sense or directions at the same time."
2) connects this to Plato, who helps us see these events of becoming
- Plato and Socrates as founding a defense of the life of the mind, "philosophy" as a discipline
- quotes from Philebus and Parmenides, aporetic dialogues (dialogues in which paradoxes presented are not resolved) --> Plato acknowledges problems but doesn't deal with them
3) suggests Plato was aware that strange events of becoming have connection to language
- paradoxes resist theory of Forms; is there a Form for hotter, colder? verbs? -- hotter is something that an individual JUDGES; how does that match the theory of Forms?
- see Sophist 235-6
- see pg 256 in Deleuze
- perhaps act as two languages; or two dimensions in language in general, only one of which Plato focused on
- true proportions of the object, but don't correspond to what we see
- Plato distinguishing betwee true objects and claimants, false reproductions (philosopher vs. sophist)
4) Lewis Carroll helps us see these paradoxes
- paradox of pure becoming goes in two directions at once;
- Deleuze wants to call this paradox of infinite identity: identity as sameness, but infinite in that it continues/persists in sameness
- Sorites paradox: when does a pile of pebbles become a heap? --> a heap is a LINGUISTIC thing, at which language assigns limits;
- but language also transcends limits "and restores them to the infinite equivalence of an unlimited becoming" (3)
- "infinite equivalence" -- "hotter" & "colder" are equivalent in some sense, but at the same time cannot be
5) undercuts common sense
- "infinite identity" vs. "personal identity"
- infinitives vs. substantives